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ABSTRACT
As is evident in areas of privacy, security, and ethics, the hindrances to research is
the lack of validated real-world data. Therefore, people resort to creating their own
dataset and/or artificially increasing the size of existing datasets. However, in areas like
countermeasures of phishing, this is not only insufficient but could introduce bias in the
dataset in the process.
To raise the awareness of bias in Machine Learning (ML) / Artificial Intelligence
(AI) and its consequences, this work tries to gauge one of its occurrences reliably, namely
selection bias when generating more samples from existing samples in a dataset.
However, there is currently no cross‐disciplinary or cross‐sector consensus in approaches
to identifying or validating measurements, metrics, and key indicators of bias, or how
data should be measured or understood in context.
The problem presented in this thesis relies on investigating the effects of selection
bias on Adversary-Aware Online Support Vector Machines (AAOSVM) with the help of
support vectors to represent selection bias.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
To take full advantage of the Internet, one must know how to use it. The freedom
we enjoy comes in part from protection against harmful actions [1]. Socially Engineered
Attacks (SEA) are one of the major forms of attacks that plague organizations as we
accept the digitalization of various aspects of work [2], [3]. Not every cyber-threat has
the same goal or impact [4]. It is increasingly difficult to keep up with the malicious
actors who want to steal user’s information and money. There is a paradigm shift in
cybersecurity, whereby users are the first line of defense in online security of anything
that is digital, e.g., networks, systems, users’ passwords and users’ identities. This
paradigm shift in cybersecurity requires the involvement of as many areas of research [5].
SEAs differ in scale and scope making it difficult for cybersecurity experts to
detect and prevent it [6]–[8]. The economic impact of an average data breach has risen
from $4.9 million in 2017 to $7.5 million in 2018 [4]. A successful phishing attack can
lead to much more losses as the leak of sensitive information can have long term future
ramifications as well [9].
The work presented in this thesis is focused on the website phishing - one aspect
of the SEAs. Phishing is a popular type of cyber-attack that uses messages (usually via
emails) as its medium of attacks [6]–[8], [10], [11]. Phishing attempts to acquire sensitive
information using malicious URLs are through electronic communication mediums or by
1
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phone [6]. For example, consider the situation when one arrives at a potential fraudulent
website either by clicking on a link or by searching for it; it is wise to have accurate
means of detecting if that website is legitimate or not.
There is a gap between threat and defense, as ill-intentioned people deploy
increasingly sophisticated attack technology and engage in cyber-crime as the world
becomes more connected [5]. Phishing as a SEA cannot be solved just by informing the
end users [12].
Considering the security risks involved and the need for appropriate cybersecurity
responses – that can scale to every changing landscape – the motivation of this research is
to explore the role of adversarial machine learning techniques employed in defending
against the spread of phishing attacks. In this chapter, we introduce foundational concepts
that we leveraged in the formulation of our problem statement, objectives, and specific
aim of this work.
1.1

Social Engineering

Social Engineering (SE) in cybersecurity is the manipulation of trust of people to
steal private information [13]. One popular mode of doing this is by phishing. Phishing
can be categorized into two types based on how users are manipulated to carry out an
attack. In the first type of a phishing attack, the user actively participates - where the user
unintentionally inputs information or carrying out an action, such as downloading a virus.
On the contrary, the second type of phishing attack is where the user passively
participates: the user is monitored on malicious websites or by unsuspectingly
downloading a virus when opening an email.
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Socially engineered attacks (SEA) – phishing included – start by either actively or
passively gathering information about the user. Once sufficient information is gathered
the next set of phishing attacks are carried out days later [15], [16]. Here, attackers use
the gathered information in any way they want to in order to exploit the user. By this
point, it is extremely difficult for anyone, even a cybersecurity expert, to detect or
mitigate the attack.
As of now, we have three methods of mitigating phishing attacks: (a) Manual
mitigation, which should be avoided for many reasons—two of the main reasons being
that it is inefficient and that it is error-prone, (b) Blacklisting malicious websites, which is
good but must be constantly updated and does not account for new websites, and (c) The
use of machine learning based heuristics which is considered the best and most reliable
methods.
Recent advances in cyber security have shown that machine learning (ML) has
played an important role in building monitoring systems to defend against socially
engineered attacks. However, attackers target monitoring systems with the intent of
deceiving models built to protect users. Adversarial machine learning (AML) is an area
of research aimed at understanding the role of machine learning algorithms against
carefully targeted attacks, with the intent of creating countermeasures to enable more
secure learning algorithms.
In the context of adversarial learning - there are basically two types of adversarial
attacks prominently studied in related works namely, poisoning and evasion.
Poisoning attacks try to mislead the machine learning algorithm during the
training phase by manipulating only a small fraction of the training data to increase the
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number of misclassified samples at test time significantly [14]. Evasion attacks consist
of manipulating input data at test time to cause misclassifications. In this thesis, we will
focus on evasion attacks [14].
1.2

Adversarial Setting

The challenge of detecting adversarial attacks using phishing is that the strategies
used by the phishers adapt with time and the targeted user.
1.2.1

Adversarial Machine Learning (AML)
Most ML algorithms are designed to work on specific problems with datasets.

From these datasets, both training and test data are derived to train and test a ML model.
It is standard practice that both training and test data originate from the same statistical
distribution. When those models are applied to the real world, adversaries aim to supply
data that violates any statistical assumption made by a classifier. Attackers arrange the
data to exploit vulnerabilities and compromise the performance of a classifier.
On the contrary, AML is a machine learning technique that attempts to fool
models by supplying deceptive inputs. The intent is to cause a malfunction in a machine
learning model. This malfunction will depend on the type of threat that it is facing. For
example, the malfunction could be to misclassify a set of instances or not to “understand”
what the true difference between a phishing and a legitimate website is.
Adversary-aware machine learning (AAML) models takes into consideration an
attacker (simulated or not). The attacker’s objective is to make the classifier performance
decrease, either in general or for some specific samples. This is one of the
countermeasures taken against the attacker.
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In the case of the AAOSVM, it is done by calculating probabilities of each label,
having, and changing the scores for each sample, and only training on a sample if it
reaches a certain threshold [16].
1.2.2

Adversarial Sampling Techniques (AST)
As is evident in areas of privacy, security, and ethics [5], the hindrances to the

research is the lack of validated real-world data. We would benefit with data that was
collected from a real-world phishing attack and solely verified that it is what indeed it
was supposed to be. Due to the sparsity of the data, we employ data from ASTs that
simulate a phishing attack.
AST as a technique randomly chooses a data sample from the input dataset and
modifies the data sample with the intent of causing a machine learning to misclassify the
said sample.
1.3

Perspectives of Bias

Bias is the simplifying assumptions made by a machine learning model that skews
the overall model performance. Here, we emphasize the various types of bias in ML
specifically with the SVM algorithm.
1.3.1

Bias from Machine Learning Model
Parameter bias in the context of the linear SVM and it makes use of Eq. 1-1,

where the 𝑏 is called bias or threshold, depending on the source [17], [18]. It only means
that it is dislocating the hyperplane from the origin.
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑤 𝑇 ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏

Eq. 1-1
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This terminology derives from the point of view that the output of the
transformation is biased toward being 𝑏 in the absence of any input i.e., 𝑓(𝑥) will tend to
𝑏 if 𝑏 >> (𝑤 𝑇 ∙ 𝑥), either by 𝑏 being too big or 𝑤 𝑇 ∙ 𝑥 being too small.
1.3.2

Bias Brought by Disparity in the Dataset

Figure 1-1: Examples of bias in the dataset without discrimination.
Each feature tends towards a certain value. Figure 1-1 shows two features, one
with a preference for the value of 1, and another avoiding the value of 1.
This is more evident when the classes are separated. Figure 1-2 shows the
difference in bias (i.e., preference) in the data for two features for each class.
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Figure 1-2: Examples of bias in the dataset with discrimination. The blue histograms
represent the phishing instances, and the orange histograms represent the legitimate
instances.
Whenever an instance has the value of -1 for the “SFH” or “popUpWindow”
feature, a classifier trained on this dataset could be likely to predict this instance as a
phishing instance. Similarly, if an instance has the value of 1 for the “SFH” or the value
of 0 “popUpWindow” feature, a classifier trained on this dataset could likely predict this
instance as a phishing instance.
One way to overcome this problem would be to generate more samples with the
other, less preferred values, until a balance is achieved, should this be a problem for the
classifier.
1.3.3

Bias Introduced During the Creation of the Dataset
The human perception influences what should and what should not be in the

dataset. Another way to introduce bias to the dataset is not to know what is important and
what is not important to insert into it.
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In our case, this could be what websites were captured to be in the dataset or
which features are chosen to represent a website. This is known as selection bias.
According to Wikipedia:
“Selection bias is the bias introduced by the selection of individuals, groups, or
data for analysis in such a way that proper randomization is not achieved,
thereby ensuring that the sample obtained is not representative of the population
intended to be analyzed.”
1.3.4

Bias Introduced During the Preprocessing of the Dataset
By changing the dataset by removing samples or generating more samples from

selected samples of the dataset, we have another “side” of selection bias, where the
dataset could already represent a good generalization of the problem, but by introducing
or removing samples, the dataset becomes skewed towards one or more classes.
1.4

Problem Statement

Countermeasures for phishing in social engineering deal with a constantly
changing data stream that causes the classifier to malfunction.
This is especially problematic in the academic setting because there are not many
datasets publicly available. Even when you create your own dataset, it is impossible to
capture the dynamic changes in the data. To compensate for this, we decided to use an
Adversarial Sampling Technique (AST) [12] to simulate an attacker. In the attack
simulation, one must be careful not to introduce bias. An attacker with the same goal,
knowledge, and influence as the simulation should be able to make a successful attack.
We also need to try to compensate the misclassification in the classifier. For this,
we implemented a modified version of the Adversary-Aware Online SVM (AAOSVM)
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[19]. It can change the sample scores during training and takes into account the
adversarial nature of the data.
Objectives:
•

To create a baseline: Compare batch classifiers from sklearn with
incremental SVM from sklearn and with AAOSVM [19] performances.

•

Data standardization and pre-processing: Investigate the effects of
normalization on sklearn classifiers on its performances.

•

Data mining: Investigate the effects of generated labels by clustering on
generated data bias metrics.

•

Validation: Investigate the effects of making the AAOSVM more dynamic
on bias metrics and performance.

•

Assessment: Investigate the effects of selection bias by using support
vectors to generate more data.

Research Question 1: If support vectors are used as AST seed samples, will it
cause more misclassification?
Research Question 2: Is there a class imbalance in the generated data by AST
and does it negatively affect the classification algorithm?
Research Question 3: How does the AAOSVM behave in the worst-case
scenario, with changing scores?
1.5

Key Contributions

The specific aim of this research is to raise awareness about the consequences of
bias in machine learning, especially in areas where the data that is publicly available is
hard to find and does not consider the context in which it is meant for such as phishing.
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With the help of four datasets and with four experiments, we present an
investigation on the effect of bias at the data preprocessing level. An AST will be used to
mimic an attacker and an AAOSVM as a model of the end user.
The algorithm from [12] was reproduced according to what is presented in the
paper. This AST used to model the attacker will go against the AAOSVM to see how that
would change its behavior. The objective of this work is to shed light on the role of
selection bias brought by the AST.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 (Background)
consists of an overview of previous works. Chapter 3 (Methodology) outlines the
experiments in terms of used datasets, assumptions, settings, algorithms, performance,
and bias metrics. Chapter 4 (Results and Discussion) encapsulates the results of the
experiments and discussion. Chapter 5 (Conclusion and Future Works) contains
suggestions for further research, refinements, and improvements.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

2.1

Challenges of Phishing Datasets

In the beginning, people did all the work of selecting which websites were
legitimate, and these people were experts or the users themselves. As the attacker is
always trying to exploit certain traits in human behavior [11], [20], the experts would
look for flaws such as misspelling and suspicious links, to blacklist those websites
manually.
Some considerations must be made regarding when a phish is considered
successful or not and the amount of untrained people that fall for them. Phishing could be
considered successful by clicking on a link or by giving information to a website, for
example [20]. Untrained people have a high rate of falling in a phishing attempt (about
52%) [20], but even trained people might misclassify websites (sometimes misclassifying
real websites as well, out of suspicion) [21]. Maybe that has to do with training, as a
report from a company of awareness training shows that the percentage of people that
falls for phishing decreases significantly after only 90 days of training and gets as low as
5% after a year of training [22].
While it is important to train as much people as possible, with the growth of the
Internet and the number and complexity of the attacks, it became virtually impossible to
defend against them just by manually selecting each website.
11
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2.2

Creation of the Dataset

Services like PhishTank©1 started being used to blacklist and whitelist,
respectively, websites so users and other services, such as google.com, could use them to
know which websites to trust and which to avoid. This approach is insufficient as there is
zero-day attacks and similar ones that can get through it [7], but necessary, as many
datasets are built from it to be used [23].
2.3

Extracting Information from the Dataset

Many companies use ML tools to extract information from a vast amount of data.
These tools are especially useful when dealing with problems such as phishing [24].
Supervised learning is a method that involves the system learning to map inputs and
outputs based on existing input and output pairs. Supervised learning consists of
techniques including SVM, linear regression, decision trees (DT), and neural networks
(NN) [25]. There are several issues to consider when using supervised learning [26].
These issues are bias-variance tradeoff, functional complexity, dimensionality of the
input space, and noise in the output values. Bias-variance tradeoff refers to the tradeoff
between the bias and variance of a learning algorithm [27]. Bias refers to the error from
erroneous assumptions in the learning algorithm. High bias can result in under-fitting.
Variance refers to the error from sensitivity to small fluctuations in the training set. High
variance can result in overfitting [28]. The prediction error of a learned classifier is
related directly to the sum of the bias and variance of a learning algorithm.

1

https://phishtank.com/
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2.3.1

Feature Engineering
When it comes to phishing, many works focus on either defining features that will

improve the performance of the machine learning models or enhancing the existing
machine learning models [12], [29].
Sometimes it is a mixture of those two. For example, Niakanlahiji et al.
introduced PhishMon [30], a machine learning framework to detect phishing websites
that depends on certain features. Although it is a recent development, is scalable, and
independent of third parties, it fails to consider the very nature of phishing attacks.
The problem with works that focus mainly on the features is that attackers can
decipher which features are being used to decide what is a phishing attempt and what is
legitimate and mimic it.
A good example would be the work of Shirazi et al. who tried to determine the
most important features that would distinguish a phishing website from a legitimate one
[9]. They tried to avoid anything that was convoluted, like DNS routing, or that could be
compromised later – at least from an academic point of view, like third party services.
Another possibility would be to focus on something such as URL and the
reasoning that phishing websites’ URLs can be identified by a trained person with a
certain ease [31], then URL shortening comes along and your work becomes not so valid
anymore.
2.3.2

Enhancing Machine Learning Models
Jiang et al. developed a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) that automatically

extract features from the URL [32]. It combines deep neural network with natural
language processing and threat intelligence to do so. That could potentially be robust
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against an adversarial attack, especially because it uses incremental updates, but it did not
explore that possibility [32].
Pereira et al. distinguished legitimate from phishing domains with precision and
accuracy with the use of graphs [33]. Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) was used to
simulate an attacker. Although good classification was obtained in an adversarial
environment, only the domain part of the website was used. From making graphs of
domains from DGAs, one can see that there are some trends [33].
A few more considerations noted by Shirazi et al. [12] attackers have full control
over the URL, except the Second Domain Level (SDL); therefore, any solution that does
not account for or does not have room for considering the website content would be
disregarded in the real world. Considering that your information still has not been stolen
by just entering the website, the content of the website will determine if it will or not be
stolen.
Figueroa et al. devised an AAOSVM that uses game theory to help in the
classification process [19]. There are a few problems with it. First, they create their own
dataset using natural language processing, not accounting for possible introduced bias.
Second, it uses a function that is nowhere to be found and it is based on a library that has
poor documentation, making reproduction near impossible.
2.4

Bias in the Dataset

In one way or another, Chiew et al. noted some ways a dataset could have bias
introduced during and from its assembly step [23], namely (1) how big it is (interferes
with the standard error), (2) where are the samples coming from, (3) how popular are the
websites being used in the dataset, (4) without due description, the dataset could be using
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a high volume of the same brand, (5) unproper distribution of website categories, and (6)
not enough languages (English, Spanish, etc.).
The focus of Shirazi et al. [9] is to try to create an unbiased dataset. Shirazi et al.
points to two main causes of bias in the dataset: (1) too many features with not enough
arguments to sustain those choices of features, and (2) many datasets are based on URL
or content – [12] considered the potential bias in at least one of the used datasets; the
remark made was about the use of URL length. As a sidenote, (1) Shirazi et al. also said
that content-based dataset is not efficient due to the number of training features, (2) that
third-party servers violate user privacy, and (3) while URL-based datasets have a good
indicator of phishing attacks, their features make them unlikely to be used in the future as
the attackers have complete control over the URL (except the domain part, at least for
now).
2.5

Benchmarking Phishing Datasets

It is not easy to find publicly available datasets for phishing and many researchers
use their own dataset for their experiments. This makes benchmarking for anti-phishing
techniques very difficult [23]. The two main reasons for not finding publicly available
datasets in this area are because (1) it is dealing with sensitive information and cannot be
or stay publicly available for long, and (2) it was hosted somewhere but it was moved or
deleted without a trace (ironically, it seems to be the case for the dataset from [23]).

CHAPTER 3
METHODS

3.1

Creation of the AAOSVM

In this thesis, we base our implementation of the SVM algorithm with Sequential
Minimal Optimization (SMO) inspired by Charest implementation [34][35]. We describe
the SVM using the following definitions.
⃗⃗ ): instances that are closer to the hyperplane
Definition 1. Support vectors (𝜶
and influence the position and orientation of the hyperplane.
⃗⃗ ): the hyperplane function that defines the
Definition 2. Objective function 𝑾(𝜶
class label of an instance, calculated as the RHS on Eq. 3-1.
𝑁

𝑁

𝑁

1
max 𝑊(𝛼) = ∑ 𝛼𝑖 − ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑗 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑗 𝛼𝑖 𝛼𝑗
⃗
𝛼
2
𝑖=1

Eq. 3-1

𝑖=1 𝑗=1

where 𝑁 is the number of instances in the dataset and the second term of the RHS is
multiplying with itself. Maximizing 𝑊(𝛼 ) while respecting the constraint Eq. 3-2
constitutes the basis of the SVM.
𝑁

∑ 𝑦𝑖 𝛼𝑖 = 0

Eq. 3-2

𝑖=1

where 0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 𝐶, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚, and 𝑚 is the number of instances.
The support vectors (α) are rounded to zero or a constant (𝐶) if they are close to
one of those values.
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The next steps are to condense all the functions into the SVM class for later
modifications, implement windowing, implement sample “check” (only poorly classified
samples will make the model retrain), and join all of these before making changes to the
SVM itself. This is brought about by SVM windowing and the definition of training
criteria described below.
Definition 3. Bias or threshold 𝒃: the dislocation of the hyperplane from the
origin.
Definition 4. The weight vector (𝑤
⃗⃗ ): the normal vector of the hyperplane and the
minimal distance to the hyperplane, defined as Eq. 3-3,
𝑁

𝑤
⃗⃗ = ∑ 𝑦𝑖 𝛼𝑖 𝑥𝑖

Eq. 3-3

𝑖=1

where 𝑁 is the number of instances in the window.
During the training, the AAOSVM always looks at a pair of samples at a time, so
the update on the weight vector is done using Eq. 3-4. This saves computational power
by only computing the change of the two samples observed and then added to the old
vector.
𝑤
⃗⃗ = 𝑤
⃗⃗ 𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝑦1 (𝑎1𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝛼1𝑜𝑙𝑑 )𝑥1 + 𝑦2 (𝑎2𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝛼2𝑜𝑙𝑑 )𝑥2

Eq. 3-4

When optimizing, the SVM uses a vector of prediction errors to determine which
sample will make the best pair to train on. The SVM windowing is implemented with the
size of 100 samples, i.e., the maximum number of samples that the model knows is 100.
The window slides one sample at a time, i.e., with each new sample, and if the window is
full, the last one is discarded. Although the model is trained on a sliding window, it keeps
its “knowledge” (values of α and 𝑏).
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Definition 5. The training criteria: trains the classifier whenever samples that
are considered poorly classified, as expressed in Eq. 3-5.
𝑦𝑖 × (𝑤
⃗⃗ 𝑖−1 . 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖−1 ) < 𝜀

Eq. 3-5

where 𝑤
⃗⃗ 𝑖−1 and 𝑏𝑖−1 are the weight and bias term from the previous training iterations.
The variable ε has the value of 0.6 which adopted this value on their algorithm
[36]. This threshold sets the scaling of 𝑤
⃗⃗ and could have been any positive number [18].
Finally, before making major changes on the SVM itself, we merged the sliding
window with the sample selection.
3.2

Experimental Settings

All experiments presented in this thesis adopts the framework shown in Figure
3-1. Each experiment was repeated 10 times and the results reported are an average
across 10 iterations.
3.2.1

Proposed Framework

Figure 3-1: Overview of the framework adopted in this thesis.
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All the class labels are verified and changed, if necessary, to +1 as a phishing
instance and -1 as a legitimate instance. As part of our validation, all the dataset but 200
instances is used for 5-fold cross validation.
All the classifiers that are used to compare against the AAOSVM have parameters
set as listed in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1: Parameters used in the classifiers.
Classifier

Parameters

Nearest Neighbors (KNN)

K=3

Linear SVM (SVC,
kernel=”linear”)

C =100, max_iter =10000, random_state = 42

RBF SVM (SVC, kernel=”rbf”)

Gamma = 2, C = 100, max_iter =10000,
random_state=42

Decision Tree

max_depth = 5, random_state = 42

Random Forest

max_depth = 5, n_estimators =10, max_features = 1,
random_state = 42

Naive Bayes

-

Gradient Boost

random_state = 42

OSVM (SGDOneClassSVM)

random_state = 42

AAOSVM

C = 100, m =100, Gp = 250, Em =10, Er = 10, Ym =
10, Yr = 10, s = 0.6, kernel_type = "linear", k = 3,
max_optimization = 2

Some classifiers need a seed to initialize. This is given by the “random_state”
attribute. If no seed is given, every iteration (run) of every dataset could lead to a
different performance that has nothing to do with the input data. The reason for them to
have a fixed initial random state is that we do not want to introduce a potential bias to the
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experiments. Whenever an experiment does not follow these settings, it will be
mentioned.
3.2.2

Bias Metrics
Class Imbalance (CI) is used to measure the imbalance of class labels after the

AST as shown in Eq. 3-6.
𝐶𝐼 =

𝑛𝑝 − 𝑛𝑙
𝑛𝑝 + 𝑛𝑙

Eq. 3-6

where 𝑛𝑝 is the number of phishing instances and 𝑛𝑙 is the number of legitimate
instances. The value of CI ranges from -1 to 1, where -1 signifies that there is only
legitimate instances, 0 signifies that there is a perfect balance of labels, and 1 signifies
that there is only phishing instances.
Difference in Positive Proportions of True Labels (DPPTL) is also used to track
the imbalance of class labels after the AST as shown in Eq. 3-7.
𝑛𝑎𝑝 𝑛𝑑𝑝
𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝐿 =
−
𝑛𝑎 𝑛𝑑

Eq. 3-7

where 𝑛𝑎 is the number of all the samples that have a certain value on a specific attribute,
𝑛𝑎𝑝 is the same as 𝑛𝑎 but are labeled as phishing, 𝑛𝑑 is the number of all the samples that
do not have that certain value on a specific attribute, and 𝑛𝑑𝑝 is the same as 𝑛𝑑 but are
labeled as phishing. It needs to be calculated for each manipulated feature.
A positive DPPL value indicates that there is a preference towards that certain
value in that specific attribute. This is referred to as positive bias. Similarly, a negative
DPPL value indicates that there is a preference towards other values other than the certain
value in that specific attribute. This is referred to as negative bias.
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DPPTL can also be used to check Demographic Parity (DP) as shown in Eq. 3-8
[37], which checks if the classifier uses an attribute to predict the labels or not:
𝐷𝑃 = 𝑃(𝑌̂ = 𝑦̂) = 𝑃(𝑌̂ = 𝑦̂|𝐴 = 𝑎)

Eq. 3-8

where 𝑌̂ are all the predicted labels and 𝐴 are all the values of a specific attribute.
In this thesis, we employ the Euclidean distance (𝑑) as shown in Eq. 3-9:
𝑎

𝑑(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖′ )

𝑗

′𝑗

= √∑(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 )2

Eq. 3-9

𝑗=1

It is calculated for each original sample that has at least one sample from the generated
samples to be classified as a legitimate sample. Only the smallest distance from the
original sample to the generated samples where that original sample generated is kept.
3.2.3

Performance Metrics
The following performance metrics are employed to determine the classifier

performance. The classifiers were measured and compared performances in Accuracy
(ACC). Accuracy is measured to see the correctness of the models. Accuracy is
represented in Eq. 3-10:
𝐴𝐶𝐶 =

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

Eq. 3-10

True Positive Rate (TPR) or Recall (R) is also known as sensitivity. It is trivial to
achieve recall of 100% by making the model classify everything as phishing. A high
sensitivity model is reliable when its result is negative since it rarely misclassifies the TP.
A negative model outcome can be taken as TN. However, a positive outcome in a model
with high sensitivity is not necessarily useful. TPR is captured in Eq. 3-11:
𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

Eq. 3-11

22
The formula of Precision (PRE) is included to calculate the F1-score (F1) and is
defined in Eq. 3-12:
𝑃𝑅𝐸 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃

Eq. 3-12

F1-score (F1) is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. It is another way of
looking at a model’s accuracy. It is also commonly used to compare the model’s
performances. An important thing to note is that this measure is dependent on the class
imbalance [40]. F1-score is represented in Eq. 3-13:
𝐹1 =

3.2.4

2 × 𝑃𝑅𝐸 × 𝑅𝐸𝐶
𝑇𝑃
=
1
𝑃𝑅𝐸 + 𝑅𝐸𝐶
𝑇𝑃 + 2 (𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)

Eq. 3-13

Instance Selection
We believe that the choice of which instances will be kept away from the training

can bias how the model behaves. Take Figure 3-2 as an example. If we had to select four
instances to keep away from training, the ones that have been circled are good candidates.
They are good candidates because two of them represent the class and two of them
represent the ones that most likely will cause some trouble for the classifiers, as
represented by the hyperplane in red.

Feature 2
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Feature 1
Figure 3-2: Desired instance selection.
Now imagine we did the selection shown in Figure 3-3 instead. We most likely

Feature 2

would never generate a new sample that would cause any trouble.

Feature 1
Figure 3-3: Undesired instance selection.
Our investigation on the effect of bias at the data preprocessing level works on the
premise that the AST will be used to mimic an attacker and the AAOSVM as a model
of the end user. We devised four types of experiments to test and show how an attack
from an AST would influence each type of classifiers as follows:
1. Experiment 1: Evaluation of machine learning classifiers with both the
datasets as they are and the datasets with normalized data with the use of
minmax normalization.
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2. Experiment 2: Evaluation of an online SVM classifier with both the
datasets as they are and the datasets with normalized data with the use of
minmax normalization.
3. Experiment 3: Evaluation of the AAOSVM on 200 randomly selected
samples and investigate the effects of generated labels by clustering on
generated data bias metrics.
4. Experiment 4: Evaluation of the AAOSVM on 200 samples selected
based on support vectors from previous experiments and investigate the
effects of:
a. generated labels by clustering on generated data bias metrics.
b. changing the scores of each sample with each training iteration.
3.3

Used Datasets

Four datasets that are publicly available on the Internet (Mendeley data and UCI
repositories) are used, to which 3 are the same as [12]. The reasons these datasets were
chosen are (i) to try to compare results with [12], (ii) to see how the algorithms will
perform on a bigger dataset, (iii) to avoid unnecessary complexity, and (iv) to avoid
introducing bias inadvertently when extracting features from emails, for example. Table
3-2 summarizes important aspects of each dataset and shows their relevance by the
number of papers that use it.
Since most of the phishing attacks involve going to a fake website at some point,
we are going to try to help better the automation of detecting them before they can do any
harm. Another thing to be pointed out is it works with these datasets; it should work with
any other that has similar feature value types.
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Table 3-2: Summary of the objective features in each dataset.
Data shape (#)

Instances

Features

Dataset

Size

Features

Legitimate

Phishing

URL
based

#
binary

#
trinary

# of
papers
that
use it

DS1a
(DS1)

58,645

111

27,998

30,647

96

9

0

1

DS2

11055

30

6157

4898

8

20

10

184

DS3

1353

9

651

702

5

2

7

270

DS4

10000

48

5000

5000

27

23

6

11

DS1b
(DS5)

88,647

111

58,000

30,647

96

9

0

1

Binary features are the ones that have only two values in the dataset. Similarly,
trinary features are the ones that have only three values in the dataset.
Dataset 1 (DS1a and DS1b) [39] is the only one that differs from the ones used in
[12], since the dataset created by Shirazi not available for public use. This dataset is the
biggest and the most recent one, not only instance wise but feature wise as well. It has
two versions – one to favor machine learning models and another to mimic real-world
scenarios. Most of its features are about the number of certain characters in the URL and
the total number of characters of parts of the URL.
Based on [23], this is the only one of the 4 used datasets that is significantly large
enough to be used in anti-phishing research. From here onwards, DS1a will be called
DS1 and DS1b will be called DS5.
Dataset 2 (DS2) [40], [41] has all the features of Dataset 3 plus twenty more, but
it has about nine times more instances. We might see some correlation between the two.
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All the features in Dataset 3 (DS3) [42], [43] are in the format of 1, 0, and -1. It
also has three class labels, namely: “Legitimate”, “Suspicious”, and “Phishy”, websites,
respectively. For the sake of reproducibility, all the “suspicious” labels are considered as
“phishy”.
DS3 is the smallest dataset both in instances and features. Five of its features look
at the URL for clues for whether a website is legitimate. These include looking at the
presence of a symbol and the length of the URL. The other five features take a deeper
look at the website. Those include checking if the URL will lead to another domain, how
big is the traffic on the website, and if there is a DNS record.
In terms of features, this Dataset 4 (DS4) [44]–[46] is almost as balanced as DS3
in terms of how many features are dedicated to the URL alone and has about as many
instances as DS2. It is the only dataset to have features with values of a continuous type.
3.4

Attacker Model

The threat – a person trying to phish someone through a website – is modeled as
the AST. There are three different ways of categorizing the goal of an attack, as explored
by [47], and it is as follows:
1. Security violations: Here there are three subcategories of violations
integrity, availability, and privacy. The attacker seeks either to enter a
system without being detected, or to make the system unavailable to the
intended users, or to steal information.
2. Attack specificity: Here there are two subcategories, targeted or
indiscriminate. The attacker seeks to fool one system (for a set of samples)
or any system (for any given sample).
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3. In error specificity, there are two subcategories, specific or generic. The
attacker intends to get a sample classified as a certain type or just
misclassified.
The attacker’s goal in this thesis is categorized as violating integrity – for not
being detected by the classifier, targeted, and specific, as we will try to bias the classifier
with sets of adversarial generated samples (each set of samples will try to mimic a certain
type).
The idea that there are attacks that come from the success from a previous attack
is not unfounded [48]. It is possible that a real attacker could have the necessary
information before the attack and that an attack could lead to another, but in a different
way. The attacker’s knowledge in this thesis is the 200 phishing websites that the
classifier does not know, all the other phishing websites and the features that the
classifier is looking for.
There are basically two types of adversarial attacks: evasion and poisoning [14],
[47]. We modeled the attacker influence as using evasion attacks, where it tries to go
undetected in the testing phase.
3.5

Adversarial Sampling Technique (AST)

For the AST, we used the Algorithm 1 from Shirazi et al. [12] with the difference
that it takes the whole training dataset to generate new samples. It should not change
anything from the original, as it was implicit that the Algorithm 1 from [12] could have
had access to the whole dataset.
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3.5.1

Conceptual Overview
For a given instance and some selected features, it will go over the dataset looking

for all the unique values in those features of the given type. With all these unique values,
it will create all the possible combinations and each combination will be a new sample.
The idea is that if a value was found in a phishing instance, for example, then it could be
used in another slightly different one.

x: instance

sel_features
[1, 2]

X

X

X

X

Y

X

0

0

X

Y

X

0

1

X

Y

X

1

0

X

Y

X

1

1

X

Y

New generated
samples

Figure 3-4: Algorithm 1 from [12], illustrated. “x” is an instance with 4 features and
a label, and the selected features are the second and the third one. “X” is any value
and “Y” is the label of that instance. In this example, all the unique values in columns
1 and 2 with the same label as “x” of the dataset are 0 and 1.
To better explain the algorithm, Figure 3-4 illustrates how the algorithm works
on an example. In the example, the dataset is made of instances of four features, each
with binary values. For a given sample and a list of selected features – the second and
third one in the example, the algorithm generates more instances from the unique values
of all the instances that have the same “Y” value as the “x” instance. It creates all
possible combinations of those values and replaces them in the selected features,
repeating the other values in the other features as well as the label.
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To test how the class imbalance brought by new samples would change and
possibly affect the model’s performance—should it be used as training sample—the
labels were also generated in two other ways. One way is to invert the original labels and
the other one is to cluster them into two groups. It is worth mentioning that we are
dealing with a dynamic environment.
3.5.2

Feature Selection
The feature selection in [12] was done randomly on purpose and so it is in this

thesis. That could lead to selection bias, for in the words of Wikipedia,
“Selection bias is the bias introduced by the selection of individuals, groups, or
data for analysis in such a way that proper randomization is not achieved,
thereby ensuring that the sample obtained is not representative of the population
intended to be analyzed.”
Because of the nature of the features in some datasets such as DS1, it could not be
done up to four features as it was in [12]. Each number between the parentheses in
Figure 3-5 is the number of samples generated by a single instance. In the last case of
Figure 3-5, we are dealing with three manipulated features, which will generate more
than 100 million samples, and this process will not only be repeated two more times but
will also become more computationally expensive once another feature is manipulated.
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Figure 3-5: Generation of samples. Number of samples generated for each seed
sample, according to number of features manipulated.
3.5.3

Sample Seed Selection
Shirazi et al. [12] did not say how they reserved the 200 samples for the AST. We

assume it is randomly selected. That could lead to selection bias. We tried two more ways
of selecting the sample seeds to see how it affects the models’ predictions.
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Algorithm 1 Dataset Split
Input: {𝑋, 𝑦, 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒}
Output: 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 , 𝑋𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 , 𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 , 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
1: Initialize 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ← ∅
2: if 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 is a class then
3:
initialize random number generator with 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
4:
while 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) < 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 do
5:
get random index using random number generator
6:
if 𝑦[𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥] == 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 then
7:
add index to 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
8:
end if
9:
end while
10:
use 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 to split 𝑋 into 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝑋𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
11:
use 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 to split 𝑦 into 𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
12: else if 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 is a list of indexes then
13:
if 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 > 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒) then
14:
use 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 to select 𝑦′
15:
use 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 to select 𝑋′
16:
add all of 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 into 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
17:
𝑟𝑎𝑑 ∶= 1
18:
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶= 2
19:
while 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 > 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒) do
20:
for each 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 and 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 in 𝑋 that is labeled as phishing do
21:
for each 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒′ in 𝑋′ that is labeled as phishing do
22:
𝑐 ← calculate distance from 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 to 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒′
23:
if 𝑐 > 0 and 𝑐 <= 𝑟𝑎𝑑 and 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 > 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒) then
24:
add 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 to 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
25:
end if
26:
if 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 == 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒) then
27:
break
28:
end if
29:
end for each
30:
if 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 == 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒) then
31:
break
32:
end if
33:
end for each
34:
𝑟𝑎𝑑 ∶= √𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡
35:
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 += 1
36:
end while
37:
else if 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 == 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒) then
38:
use 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 to split 𝑋 into 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝑋𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
39:
use 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 to split 𝑦 into 𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
40: else
41:
initialize random number selector with 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
42:
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ← 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 samples from 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 using random number selector
43:
use 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 to split 𝑋 into 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝑋𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
44:
use 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 to split 𝑦 into 𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
45: end if
46: end if

Figure 3-6: Dataset Split.
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The other two ways of selecting the sample seeds is using the support vectors
from the linear SVM from sklearn and the support vectors from AAOSVM. This resulted
in the lists that had various lengths. To keep it standardized at 200 samples, we used
Algorithm 1. This algorithm assures that 200 samples are always kept out to be used in
the AST. If the number of support vectors is less than 200, it uses the minimal distance
from the support vectors to other samples to complete the selection of 200 samples.
3.6

Adversarial Classification

For adversarial classification, we used an AAOSVM based of [19]. The general
idea of its workings can be seen on Figure 3-7.
Our assumptions from the paper to create the dataset
1. The websites were never changed after the training started, i.e., all the
messages that had been maliciously modified were already modified. This
means that the classifier actions did not affect the behavior of the adversary.
2. The number of clusters is arbitrarily defined as three, since there are thought
to be three types existing, namely (Regular, Fraud), (Malicious, Fraud), and
(Regular, Not Fraud).
3. The type of an instance is only which cluster it belongs to [24].
3.6.1

Optimization of the AAOSVM
The optimization in the AAOSVM (SMO) comes from [35].
Definition 6. Cluster Type (𝒛): 𝑧 is the cluster of which an instance can belong

to. An instance can belong to any of three clusters, namely 𝑧1 , 𝑧2 , and 𝑧3 ; the union of
these clusters make 𝑍. These clusters are created using the KMeans algorithm with
random state parameter set to 42, found on the sklearn python library.
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⃗ 𝒋 : the observed instance.
Definition 7. 𝒙
Definition 8. p(𝒛): this function computes the probability of type 𝑧. It is
calculated by counting all the instances of type 𝑧 and dividing by the number of instances
in the window.
Definition 9. p(𝑴, 𝒛): this function computes probability of type 𝑧 and 𝑦 = 1.
This represents the malicious type in cluster 𝑧. It is calculated by counting all the
messages of type 𝑧 that also have 𝑦 = 1 divided by the number of messages in the
window.
Definition 10. 𝝓(𝑴|𝒛): this function computes the probability of instance 𝑥𝑗 to
be malicious, given z, and is computed as Eq. 3-16 [49]:
𝜙(𝑀|𝑧) =

𝑝(𝑀, 𝑧)
𝑝(𝑧)

Eq. 3-14

Definition 11. µ((𝒚, 𝒛)| ⃗⃗⃗
𝒙𝒋 ) is the consistent belief represented in Eq. 3-15.
𝑝(𝑧𝑗 )𝜙(𝑀|𝑧𝑗 )
, if 𝑦 = 𝑀
𝑝(𝑅) + 𝑝(𝑀)𝜙(𝑀|𝑧)
𝑝(𝑧𝑗 )
µ((𝑦, 𝑧)| ⃗⃗⃗
𝑥𝑗 ) =
, if 𝑦 = 𝑅
𝑝(𝑅) + 𝑝(𝑀)𝜙(𝑀|𝑧)
if 𝑦 = 𝑅 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑧𝑗 ≅ 𝑧
{ 0,

Eq. 3-15

where 𝑧𝑗 is the predicted cluster of 𝑥𝑗 , p(R) is the probability of an instance to be regular,
given the instances in the window, and p(M) is the probability of an instance to be
malicious, given the instances in the window.
Definition 12. Scores: The scores are one of two types: utility (𝜖) or cost (𝛾).
Each type of score will be further divided to keep score of malicious and legitimate
samples.
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⃗⃗⃗𝒋 ): the function holds the prior knowledge that is based on
Definition 13. 𝝍(𝒙
probabilities and scores. It is defined in Eq. 3-16. It is updated every 𝐺𝑝 periods or
number of samples, as stated in [19]:
𝜓(𝑥
⃗⃗⃗𝑗 ) =

∑𝑧∈𝑍 µ((𝑀, 𝑧)| ⃗⃗⃗
𝑥𝑗 ) ∙ (𝜖𝑀 + 𝛾𝑀 )
∑𝑧∈𝑍 µ((𝑅, 𝑧)| ⃗⃗⃗
𝑥𝑗 ) ∙ (𝜖𝑅 + 𝛾𝑅 )

Eq. 3-16

⃗⃗⃗𝒋 ): the function that is defined in Eq. 3-17. Adds prior
Definition 14. 𝜳(𝒙
knowledge to the training criteria (Eq. 3-5):
𝛹(𝑥
⃗⃗⃗𝑗 ) =

1 + 𝜓(𝑥
⃗⃗⃗𝑗 )
𝑇
𝑤 𝑒 + 2𝑏

Eq. 3-17

Now that 𝛹(𝑥
⃗⃗⃗𝑗 ) is defined, it is incorporated to Definition 5. The criteria used in
Figure 3-7 that decides if the SVM needs to be trained again is based off the intuition
from Eq. 3-18:
𝑦𝑦̂𝛹(𝑥) < 𝑣

Eq. 3-18

where 𝑦 ∈ {+1, −1} is the label of the instance, 𝑥, 𝑦̂ ∈ {+1, −1} is its predicted label,
and 𝑣 ∈ (0,1] is a threshold value. From that, we can say that the only two ways of
making the equation correct is to misclassify the sample or to have 𝛹(𝑥 ) < 𝑣 (or a poorly
classified sample).
Definition 15. Update parameter (𝒖): a parameter that will tell the AAOSVM if
it should change the scores or not.
Definition 16. Difference of errors (∆𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 ): when training, if the training
criteria is true, the AAOSVM will save the errors prior to training and compare with the
new errors. This comparison is used as part of the conditions to decide which score
should be updated, if 𝑢 == 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒.
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Figure 3-7: Overview of the inner workings of the AAOSVM of Dynamic Scoring.
Some changes needed to be made in the AAOSVM from [19]. Firstly, the
traceZeroes procedure is not further explained, as “based on input parameters from
Gambit for QRE computation” is not enough and is not publicly available; thus, we
adopted the strategy of changing scores. Second, the true output of the algorithm is the
optimal strategy for the classifier, as it would serve no purpose otherwise.
3.6.2

Bias in the Algorithm
From Eq. 3-16 and Eq. 3-15, it is proven that the algorithm will be biased

towards malicious messages. The more a type appears, the bigger the belief will be about
that type. The bigger the belief that a message is malicious, the bigger 𝛹(𝑥) will be; on
the other hand, the bigger the belief that a message is regular, the smaller 𝛹(𝑥) will be.
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3.6.3

Scoring Each Sample
When training, the proposed Algorithm 2 changes the scores for each label

based on the true label and the difference between previous and actual error, depending
on the value of 𝑢.
The intuition is that the score can double or zero its value if the ∆𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 is too great
or have a change that is proportional to the error difference. We expect the scores to
either settle at zero or at around some value, as the error fluctuate and gradually go to a
minimum.
To update the utility of a malicious sample, we decreased each sample’s
respective utility by itself, scaled by tanh (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟) , as shown in Eq. 3-19, if the 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
decreased as well. The intuition is that it will increase the utility of the malicious sample as the
error goes down:
𝜖𝑀 −= 𝜖𝑀 × tanh (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)

Eq. 3-19

The same happens for a regular sample, as shown in Eq. 3-20, if the 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
decreased. The intuition is that it will increase the utility of the regular sample as the error goes
down:
𝜖𝑅 −= 𝜖𝑅 × tanh (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)

Eq. 3-20

In a similar way, we update the costs as shown in Eq. 3-21 and Eq. 3-10. Now,
the costs go up as the error goes up:
𝛾𝑀 += 𝛾𝑀 × tanh (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)

Eq. 3-21

𝛾𝑅 += 𝛾𝑅 × tanh (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)

Eq. 3-22
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Algorithm 2 Adversary-Aware Online SVM of Dynamic Scoring
Input: {𝜏, 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝐺𝑝, 𝐶, 𝑘, 𝑢, 𝜖𝑅 , 𝛾𝑅 , 𝜖𝑀 , 𝛾𝑀 }
Output: 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑤 𝑇 ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏)
1: Initialize 𝑤0 ≔ 0, 𝑏0 ≔ 0, 𝑆 ← ∅
2: for each (𝑥𝜏 , 𝑦𝜏 ) ∈ 𝑇 do
𝑇
3:
if 𝑦𝜏 (𝑤𝜏−1
∙ 𝑥𝜏 + 𝑏𝜏−1 )𝛹(𝑥𝜏 ) < 𝑣 then
4:
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 ∶= 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡(𝑆) − 𝑆_𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒_𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑠
5:
Find 𝑤 ′ , 𝑏′ with prior knowledge SMO on 𝑆, with 𝑤𝜏−𝑡 and 𝑏𝜏−𝑡 as seed
hypothesis, and 𝛹(𝑥𝜏 )
6:
if 𝑢 == 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 then
7:
for each (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟, 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙) ∈ 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠, 𝑆 do
8:
if 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙 == 𝑃 then
9:
𝜖𝑀 −= 𝜖𝑀 × tanh (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)
10:
else if 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙 == 𝐿 then
11:
𝜖𝑅 −= 𝜖𝑅 × tanh (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)
12:
else if 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙 == 𝑃 then
13:
𝛾𝑀 += 𝛾𝑀 × tanh (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)
14:
else if 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙 == 𝐿 then
15:
𝛾𝑅 += 𝛾𝑅 × tanh (𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)
16:
end if
17:
end for
18:
end if
19:
Set 𝑤𝜏, ≔ 𝑤 ′ 𝑏𝜏 ≔ 𝑏′
20: end if
21: if |𝑆| > 𝑚 then
22:
Remove oldest example from 𝑆
23: end if
24: if 𝑇 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝐺𝑝 = 0 then
25:
Initialize {𝑐𝑖 }𝑘𝑖=1 = getClusters(𝑆, 𝑘)
26:
𝑝(𝑡𝑖 ) = |{𝑥|𝑥 is a message in cluster 𝑐𝑖 }|/|𝑆|, ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘}, ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑆
27:
update 𝛹(𝑥𝑖 ), ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆
28: end if
29: S.add(𝑥𝜏 , 𝑦𝜏 )
30: end for

Figure 3-8: Adversary-Aware Online SVM of Dynamic Scoring.

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As explained in Section 3.2.1, the experiment results were obtained by removing
200 samples from each dataset. To better compare the results, the same 200 samples were
removed from all classifiers. Every time an experiment was repeated, new 200 random
samples were chosen. From the remainder of each dataset, a 5-fold cross validation was
performed, measuring the time it took to do the cross validation. The only classifier that
was scored on the adversarial samples was the AAOSVM and it was only scored on bias
metrics. In the previous chapters we have shown in how many places bias could be
introduced during the training or testing of a classifier and tried to minimize them as best
as we could so we could analyze only the effects of the bias in the scope of this thesis.
4.1

Experiment 1 - Evaluation of Machine Learning Models

The classifiers used were Decision Tree (DT), Gradient Boosting (GB), Random
Forest (RF), K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), SVM with two different kernels: Linear (lin)
and Gaussian (rbf), and online SVM on a moving window of 100 samples. They all are
from the sklearn library. Except for Figure 4-19 and Figure 4-20, all the graphs in this
Section 4.1 and its subsections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 show the average of the 10 runs, with
each run having its own standard deviation from its cross validation.
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Figure 4-1: Performance metrics on machine learning models on dataset DS1.

Figure 4-2: Performance metrics on machine learning models on dataset DS2.
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Figure 4-3: Performance metrics on machine learning models on dataset DS3.

Figure 4-4: Performance metrics on machine learning models on dataset DS4.
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Figure 4-5: Performance metrics on machine learning models on dataset DS5.
From Figure 4-5, Figure 4-2, Figure 4-3, Figure 4-9, and Figure 4-5, we can
see that Gradient Boost had the best performance overall on all datasets without
normalization. Figure 4-3 shows us the effect of DS3 on the classifiers’ performance, a
small dataset with only 9 features, when we remove 200 samples from it. We think that
the reason for the DS3 to have such a variation is that 200 samples represent almost 15%
of the total dataset and almost 30% of the total number of phishing instances.
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Figure 4-6: Performance metrics on machine learning models with normalized data of
dataset DS1.

Figure 4-7: Performance metrics on machine learning models with normalized data of
dataset DS2.
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Figure 4-8: Performance metrics on machine learning models with normalized data of
dataset DS3.

Figure 4-9: Performance metrics on machine learning models with normalized data of
dataset DS4.
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Figure 4-10: Performance metrics on machine learning models with normalized data of
dataset DS5.
We can see in Figure 4-8 that the normalization using minmax decreased the
classifiers performance robustness for DS3, i.e., now the variations have a greater impact
on the classifiers’ performance. Normalization also had a bigger impact on Naïve Bayes
standard variation on each run of DS5, as shown in Figure 4-10.

Figure 4-11: SVMs as compared on ACC.
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Figure 4-12: SVMs as compared on ACC with normalized data.

Figure 4-13: SVMs as compared on TPR.
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Figure 4-14: SVMs as compared on TPR with normalized data.

Figure 4-15: SVMs as compared on F1.
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Figure 4-16: SVMs as compared on F1 with normalized data.
Looking at Figure 4-11, Figure 4-12, Figure 4-13, Figure 4-14, Figure 4-15,
and Figure 4-16, we can see that the performance and standard deviation was greatly
impacted by the normalization of the data. DS1, DS4, and DS5 had all the metrics
improve with normalization of the data for both SVMs. DS2 had all the metrics improve
with normalization of the data for both SVMs, but it was subtler for the Lin SVM. DS3
had all the metrics stay with about the same values, with or without the normalization of
the data for both SVMs.
Other deductions that can be made is that Lin SVM is more sensitive to which the
samples are being reserved. RBF SVM performance metrics had a variation of around 1%
for datasets 1 and 3, for the same type of data, which could indicate that it would be more
robust for those datasets, i.e., reserved samples do not affect its performance too much.
4.2

Experiment 2 - Performance of the Online SVM on a Moving Window
Now that the baseline for the SVM has been established, we wanted to see how an

Online SVM (OSVM) would perform on a moving window. This will not only give a
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more realistic baseline to the AAOSVM but will also show the reliability of an OSVM on
a moving window and show the importance of the features being in the range of [0,1] for
a better general performance.

Figure 4-17: Performance metrics of OSVM.

Figure 4-18: Performance metrics of OSVM with normalized data.
The only dataset that did not benefit from the normalization was DS2, probably
because its data was already mostly binary. Based on the difference between the results
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before and after normalization, we can see that when the features are engineered to be all
in the range of [0,1], the performance of the SVM could be better.
This is especially evident for DS1 and DS5, where it goes from classifying every
instance as phishing to trying to predict different labels correctly, having the accuracy go
from below 55% to above 70%. DS3 also an increase in the accuracy, going from below
50% to above 75%. While DS4 accuracy decreased, at least the TPR was not as close to
100% as it was before, meaning that it was trying to predict different labels more often.

Figure 4-19: Time to execute each run of the cross validation of the OSVM.
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Figure 4-20: Time to execute each run of cross validation of the OSVM with
normalized data, according to each dataset.
Although it is not in the scope of this thesis, we had an interesting find. During
the analysis of the data, we found that the time to train before normalization was
dependent on the run, while after normalization it was dependent on the dataset. When it
comes to timing, there are two considerations to be done. One is how long it takes to train
the model. Another is the number of features and the number of samples affect the
training time.
4.3

Experiment 3 - SVM Becoming Adversary-Aware

For here and onwards, the experiments had access to only the data without
normalization as it would have been in a real-world scenario. In this experiment, a
random combination of features, up to 2 features, was used each time.
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Figure 4-21: Performance metrics of AAOSVM, running 10x each dataset without
200 random samples.
Looking at Figure 4-21, we can see that the performance metrics are dependent
on the run and dataset.
4.4

Experiment 4 - Changing the Scores

For here and onwards, the experiments were done with just one run and on
holdout instead of 5-fold cross validation.
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Table 4-1: Performance metrics of AAOSVM changing scores, running 1x each dataset
without 200 random samples on a holdout validation.
Dataset

ACC

TPR

F1

DS1

11.09%

19.34%

13.85%

DS2

17.18%

17.04%

16.77%

DS3

16.45%

17.98%

16.26%

DS4

9.43%

19.08%

12.67%

DS5

12.86%

0.35%

0.64%

We can see from Figure 4-21 and Table 4-1 that changing the scores had a great
impact on the AAOSVM. ACC went from around 50% to around 11% on DS1, from
around 70% to around 16% on DS2 and DS3, from around 50% to less than 10% on DS4,
and from around 60% to around 13% on DS5. In addition, it was even more critical on
DS5, with TPR and F1 near 0, which means that it predicting almost every instance as
being legitimate.
To analyze the changes in the scores, we picked DS4 and DS5, DS4 for being a
balanced dataset on both class labels and feature types, and DS5 for being the biggest and
the most imbalanced of them all. Because of the disparity of the number of samples
needed for a score to reach zero, the scores were analyzed based on the first 200 samples.
It was already foreseen that once a score reaches zero, it has no way of coming
back, i.e., it will stay at zero until the classifier is reset. As stated in Section 3.6.3, we
thought that using tanh as the update function, the scores would go up and down, and
either settles at zero or at around some value, as the error fluctuates and gradually goes to
a minimum.
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Figure 4-22: Score values for DS4, on 200 samples.

Figure 4-23: Score values for DS5, on 200 samples.
The intended desired behavior is the one displayed by the utilities on DS5 and the
utility of malicious samples on DS4, as shown in Figure 4-22 and Figure 4-23.
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We did not foresee the number of samples that was needed for each score to reach
zero nor that it would happen with the error still high. It is worth noting that once both
scores for a class reach zero, 𝛹(𝑥
⃗⃗⃗𝑖 ) will be redefined as Eq. 4-1, where it no longer
depends on the sample or the scores:
𝛹=

1
+ 2𝑏

𝑤𝑇𝑒

Eq. 4-1

The costs on DS4 and DS5 went to zero with less than 120 samples, as shown in
Figure 4-22 and Figure 4-23. The utility of regular samples on DS4 with less than 160
samples means that for DS4 the scoring had no effect on 𝛹(𝑥
⃗⃗⃗𝑖 ) after only around 1% of
the samples. As both costs reach zero, they leave the scaling of the belief to just the
utilities, which are updated based on the decrease in error or correct classification of the
samples.
4.4.1

Significance of Experiment 3 and 4 – Bias Metrics
For the remainder of the results and discussion,
•

“a” represents that the support vectors from the previous AAOSVM are
being used to select the 200 samples that will be left out of training.

•

“b” represents that the support vectors from the Linear SVM are being
used to select the 200 samples that will be left out of training.

•

“n” represents that the 200 samples that will be left out of training are
randomly selected.
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Figure 4-24: Average DPPTL on one manipulated feature.
As stated in Section 3.2.2, there were 5 metrics for measuring bias but only 2 are
shown here and another 2 are shown in the next Section; this is because demographic
parity was not attained on a single instance. An important thing to be mentioned is that
not a single generated sample resulted in a false positive in DS4, even though the one
with almost 0% TPR and F1 was DS5.

Figure 4-25: Average DPPTL on two manipulated features.
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Demographic Parity and Difference in Positive Proportions of True Labels did not
carry as much information as expected. We expected to see at least a different DPPTL
value for each set of generated samples, but all the sets of generated samples in each
dataset with a set condition generated an average of about four distinct values of DPPTL.
Table 4-2: Distance from the original sample. All the selected samples’ type have the
same values for each respective dataset.
Dataset

Distance

DS1

1

DS2

2

DS3

1

DS4

0

DS5

1

It did not matter what instances were kept out of the training. It did not matter if
the AAOSVM changed scores. The minimal distance from the original sample remained
constant for each dataset. All the generated samples from an instance had at least one
sample that had the same minimal distance for the given dataset.
An important thing to consider is the cost of generating samples in the real world.
While it is reasonable to consider Euclidean distance from an academic point of view, it
is not reasonable in real life, as some features will be harder to modify than others and
some datasets have half or more features with binary values while others have ninety
percent of numerical values. Not to mention that, at least in the case of most website
phishing, there is a need to modify one feature on every sample – named URL. It is also
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important to consider how many features are being manipulated. At some point it will be
similar to creating a new instance from scratch.
4.4.2

Significance of Experiment 3 and 4 - Testing for False Positives
Here, we have the results of percentage of false positives and class imbalance.

Figure 4-26: Average percentage of FP using different seeds on the AST for different
number of manipulated features.
As stated in Section 1.4, we had three research questions. The first one was
confirmed, as shown in Figure 4-26. If support vectors are used as AST seed samples,
then the percentage of false positives can go up at least 10% in absolute number, or 25%
relative to the randomly selected samples, and up to 20% in absolute number, or 100%
relative to the randomly selected samples.
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Figure 4-27: Comparative of Class Imbalance and Percentage of FP on each dataset
for each type of sample seed.
The reason why Figure 4-26 had a big variation in the standard deviation is
shown in Figure 4-9 because the percentage of FP varies for each dataset. The second
one was dismissed as there is no correlation between the class imbalance and the
percentage of false positives as shown in Figure 4-9. In all datasets that had false
positives with the exception of DS3, the class imbalance was almost constant, with the
standard variation less than 1%. The class imbalance in DS3 varied more because of its
size. Although the class imbalance had some variations, it did not change with the
selected samples’ type but the dataset. The FP percentage varied according to the dataset
and selected samples’ type as shown in Figure 4-9.
On the one hand, small perturbations on some features can bypass the AAOSVM
and bring down the accuracy. On the other hand, even in the worst case, where the
AAOSVM had terrible performance during training and was facing generated samples
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designed to fool the classifier, the percentage of false positives did not go over 50%.
When it comes to online classifiers, adversarial attacks have an even bigger impact as
they can bias the classifier towards one class or the other. When the AAOSVM is
changing scores during training, its performance decreases, but the decrease in
performance in training is not linearly correlated with its bias metrics values. We say this
because while clearly the choice of the seed matters, as shown in Figure 4-26, the change
in FP occurs in a similar way but with different proportions, except for DS3, in Figure
4-9.
Focusing on Figure 4-9, DS1 with seed “a” has a slightly higher percentage of FP
than “b” but both are lower than “n”; DS2 with seed “a” has a higher percentage of FP
than “b” but both are higher than “n”; DS3 follows a similar pattern of DS2 with the
difference that on DS3 “b” has a lower percentage than “n”; DS5 with seed “a” has a
slightly lower percentage of FP than “b” but both are higher than “n”
As mentioned in Section 3.2, DS2 and DS3 could have some correlation, but no
experiment showed any obvious correlation.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

5.1

Conclusions

In this thesis, we have shown that the selection bias has an impact on the
AAOSVM, while class imbalance does not have an impact on the AAOSVM. Now more
experiments are needed to determine if that impact is extended to other classifiers and
initial parameters.
As explained in Section 4.2.3, if support vectors are used as AST seed samples, it
will cause more misclassification. There is a class imbalance in the generated data by
AST, but it does not affect the classification algorithm.
When the AAOSVM is changing scores during training, its performance
decreases, but the decrease in performance in training is not correlated linearly with its
bias metrics values.
5.2
5.2.1

Future Work

Poisoning Attack
With a similar framework and the experiments as this thesis, one could test the

effects of selection bias on the AAOSVM coming from a poisoning attack.
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5.2.2

Proper Metrics
The metrics used in this thesis were adapted from works on bias related to social

context. For adversarial context, we need to develop new metrics to measure the effects
of adversarial bias.
5.2.3

Other Machine Learning Models
This thesis focused on SVMs. We need to see how this would behave in other

types of machine learning models that take into account the adversarial context.
5.2.4

Tuning Machine Learning Models Parameters
It would also be interesting to see how every machine learning model would

behave if they were to go against an attack while its parameters are tuned to a specific
dataset.
5.2.5

Time to Train
As said in Section 4.2, we found an interesting dependance that is out of this

scope. We propose an investigation of this dependance for future work.
5.2.6

Improving the AAOSVM Scoring
We suggest that anyone who is willing to improve on scoring method to try a

different set of update functions and conditions to apply the update functions.
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